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Abstract
Behavioral economics has demonstrated systematic decision-making biases in both
lab and field data. But are these biases learned or innate? We investigate this question
using experiments on a novel set of subjects — capuchin monkeys. By introducing a fiat
currency and trade to a capuchin colony, we are able to recover their preferences over a
wide range of goods and risky choices. We show that standard price theory does a remarkably good job of describing capuchin purchasing behavior; capuchin monkeys react
rationally to both price and wealth shocks. However, when capuchins are faced with
more complex choices including risky gambles, they display many of the hallmark biases of human behavior, including reference-dependent choices and loss-aversion. Given
that capuchins demonstrate little to no social learning and lack experience with abstract gambles, these results suggest that certain biases such as loss-aversion are an
innate function of how our brains code experiences, rather than learned behavior or the
result of misapplied heuristics.
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“Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone
for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and
natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give
this for that.”
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
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Introduction

Over the past few decades, behavioral economists have identified that human decision makers exhibit a number of systematic biases both in the lab and in the field. Two of these
biases, reference-dependence and loss-aversion,1 have received a substantial amount of empirical attention, both from economics and neighboring disciplines such as psychology and
sociology. Evidence that agents treat losses diﬀerently than comparable gains is found in
the behavior of: individual investors (reluctant to realize losses; Odean 1998), house sellers
(unwilling to sell below buying price; Genesove & Mayer 2001), and consumers (asymmetrically more sensitive to price increases than decreases in numerous markets; Hardie et al.
1993). Despite the mounting evidence of the importance of this behavior, relatively little
attention has been paid to the question of where these biases come from in the first place.
Are such systematic biases the result of social or cultural learning and specific environmental experiences? Or could they be more intrinsic to our biology, perhaps resulting from
universal mechanisms that arise regardless of context or experience? Put another way, could
there be an innate component to our behavioral biases? The answer to these questions of
origin may eﬀect how we think about both the potential scope of behavioral biases, and the
degree to which we believe market incentives will act to reduce their eﬀects.
Traditionally, economists have remained agnostic as to the origins of human preferences,
and usually assume their stability over both time and circumstance. For example, Becker
(1976) writes, "generally (among economists)... preferences are assumed not to change
substantially over time, nor to be very diﬀerent between wealthy and poor persons, or even
between persons in diﬀerent societies and cultures."2 Indeed, coupled with maximizing
behavior and market equilibrium, Becker asserts that the assumption of stable preferences
"forms the heart of the economic approach." If much of the fundamental structure of our
1

These biases, along with a probability-weighting function, make up "prospect theory," first introduced in
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). For an excellent summary of the recent empirical work on prospect theory,
see Camerer (2000).
2
It must be stressed that Becker was referring not to preferences over market goods, but to more primitive
"underlying objects of choice" such as "health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence or envy." (Becker
1976).
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preferences were innate, this would both bolster this assumption and help explain price
theory’s positive successes.
The origins of our preferences and biases may also be important from a policy perspective; in particular it may be important to distinguish between those behaviors that are
universal and similar behaviors that are both universal and innate. For instance, a learned,
non-innate heuristic may arise in many (if not all) cultures if it easily and quickly solves a
common task or set of tasks. However, if this universal heuristic is (at least in part) learned,
we would not expect it to persist in settings in which it was highly sub-optimal, or in which
market forces strongly discipline behavior. This would limit the potential scope and scale
for welfare losses, and may suggest that policy interventions which increase feedback or
learning may eliminate what losses do exist. In contrast, if a particular bias has a strong
biologically-innate component, it may persist even in the face of large individual costs, ample feedback, and market disciplining. This would greatly change both the potential for
successful policy and the types of remedies available.
Given the similarity in spirit to questions addressed by biologists and psychologists
working in comparative behavior and cognition, we adopt an interdisciplinary approach
to this question that applies traditional economic choice methodology far from its usual
subjects. When examining questions of origin, it is widely accepted in both cognitive
science and evolutionary psychology that a mechanism is most likely evolutionarily ancient
if it explains analogous behavior in both humans and primates. That is, since primates and
humans are closely related, it is unlikely that a common trait evolved in parallel between
our two species, and much more likely common traits evolved once during our common
evolutionary heritage. The tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella) has been widely studied
in biology and psychology for just this purpose. They make excellent subjects since they
are relatively quick and adept problem solvers, skilled tool users, and a close evolutionary
neighbor to humans.3
Exploiting this evolutionary proximity to examine origins of human behavior, we first
demonstrate that the standard tools of utility maximization and price theory describe capuchin purchasing behavior in situations akin to those faced by human consumers. By
introducing a fiat currency to a capuchin colony we are able to conduct a number of
revealed-preference experiments analogous to canonical human choice experiments. Our
capuchins have learned through repeated exposure that human experimenters are willing
3

Within the set of primates though, capuchins are actually very distantly related to humans. Capuchins
diverged from our common ancestral line in what biologists call the new-world primate radiation. This is
when all the primates who inhabit the new world split oﬀ from the old-world primates, the line humans
emerged from. While the exact date of this split is not known, molecular-clock estimates suggest capuchins
split oﬀ as a genus around 23 million years ago. Estimates of our latest common ancestor date around 40
million years (Schneider et al., 2001).
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to trade small metal disks found in their environment for food rewards, and that diﬀerent
humans trade for diﬀerent rewards at diﬀerent prices.
Our first set of experiments shows that when endowed with a budget of disks and facing
several possible trading options, capuchin purchases look quite sensible. In response to both
price and wealth shocks, capuchins display all the hallmarks of rationality; they adjust their
purchasing behavior in ways consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences
(GARP).4 In this way capuchin choice closely mirrors our own, and admits all the standard
tools of utility analysis and price theory. We used this first set of experiments to validate
our experimental method, and to provide a context in which to interpret the capuchins’
latter departure from rational choice.
Our second set of experiments demonstrates that when faced with decisions involving simple gain-loss frames, capuchins demonstrate both reference-dependence and lossaversion. Specifically, in our main experiments capuchins express a strong preference for
gambles in which good outcomes are framed as bonuses rather than payoﬀ-identical gambles
in which bad outcomes are emphasized as losses, and weigh those losses more heavily than
comparable gains. Our experiments also allow us to reject most competing models of naïve
or unsophisticated choice. In particular, several of our results require a capuchin to choose
a trading partner who initially oﬀers a smaller food reward; an ability that several studies
of several monkey species and even great apes have failed to find.5
We then characterize our results in two ways. First, we discuss what results we can obtain nonparametrically, for example establishing that capuchin display reference-dependence
and loss-aversion without specifying the magnitude of either bias. Then, we calibrate a simple utility function that incorporates both loss-aversion and reference-dependence, and nests
them in a model of utility maximization. This allows us to estimate parameters such as the
capuchins’ degree of loss-aversion, and compare these parameters to analogous human results. While parametric results are always to be taken with caution, our analysis shows that
4

Early papers by Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950), and Afriat (1967) established the revealed preference approach to evaluating whether any given set of choices is consistent with rational behavior. Varian
(1982) generalized this approach, and showed that the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP),
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for any set of choices to arise from the maximization of a continuous,
concave, weakly monotonic, and locally non-satiated utility function.
5
Both new-world monkeys and great apes fail to perform optimally on reverse-contingency tasks (games
in which an experimenter presents a large reward whenever the agent reaches for a smaller treat, and presents
a small reward whenever the agent reaches for the larger treat). However, when the game is modified such
that the large reward is presented whenever the agent reaches for a picture of the small reward (and the
small reward is presented whenever the agent reaches for a picture of the large reward) both apes and
new-world monkeys succeed. A contribution of our work to the psychology literature is that we report the
surprising result that capuchins have no trouble solving a reverse-contingency task when treats are obtained
by exchanging fiat currency for the rewards, rather than simply reaching for them. That is, token-mediated
exchange allows primates to overcome the impulse to simply reach for the greater reward — just as picturemediated choice does in chimpanzees and tamarins.
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the relative strength of losses to gains in capuchin decisions (the coeﬃcient of loss-aversion)
is indistinguishable from similar human estimates, suggesting common mechanisms underlie
these behavioral preferences in our two species.
Arguing against loss-aversion as a learned trait among our capuchins is the novelty of the
situation; abstract gambles were first introduced to these capuchins by our experiments, and
subjects encountered them alone, away from others. In addition, an abundance of research
has shown that capuchins lack all but the most rudimentary forms of social learning. Indeed,
the commonly held belief that monkeys are skilled imitators (hence the adage, "monkey see
monkey do") has not been born out in either lab or field data.6 Knowledge transfers such
as imitative learning have been found to be rare in all non-human primates, including apes
(see Tomasello and Call, 1997).7 In the absence of social learning then, our results suggest
an early-evolutionary origin for loss-averse behavior in humans. That is, our results suggest
that loss-aversion is innate and evolutionarily prefigured, a function of decision making
systems which evolved before the common ancestors of capuchins and humans diverged.

2

Previous Empirical Work and Experiments

Recently several papers have employed methodologies which attempt to shed light on the
underpinnings of behavioral biases. A growing literature in the field of neuroeconomics
has attempted to use imaging technology to map brain activity as subjects make economic
decisions, and correlates these measures of brain activity to subjects’ decisions. For example McClure, Laibson, Lowenstein, & Cohen (2004) show the spatial distribution of brain
activity is correlated with decisions involving intertemporal choice. While this approach
is extremely useful in shedding light on the mechanisms of decision making, the ability of
this approach to address questions of universality and stability is limited by the scope of
activities that can be scanned (subjects must be securely restrained inside a large magnet)
and by the diﬃculty of translating neural correlates of behavior into causal statements.8
6

For instance, though capuchins are highly-skilled tool manipulators, observing a fellow capuchin successfully use a tool to solve a problem does not help a capuchin learn to use that tool any faster (Visalberghi
1993.)
7
A notably outlier in this literature, a recent study by Brosnan and deWaal (2004) shows that when forced
to directly observe a conspecific displaying a strong choice preference, capuchins subsequently alter their
choices in line with the observed behavior. We address this possible concern by not allowing capuchins to
observe each other’s choices during our experiments. For an excellent summary of the literature on capuchin
social learning, see Fragaszy, Visalberghi & Fedigan (2004).
8
McClure et al (2004) sheds light on the neural mechanisms which facilitate intertemporal decision making; it uses brain scan data to support the already well establish model of Laibson β-δ discounting (Laibson,
1997) without addressing how stable or universal this mechanism might be. In neuroscience and biology
more broadly, this problem is conceptualized as one of separately identifying the proximate (mechanical)
cause of an behavior and the ultimate cause (evolutionary forces or incentive structures.) In short, the
neuroeconomic approach addresses a diﬀerent set of questions than the approach we employ in this paper,
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More similar in goals to our approach, Henrich et al. (2001) perform behavioral experiments in fifteen small scale societies, all of which are relatively isolated and have had
relatively limited market contact. Essentially, their approach exploits the extreme cultural
variation between these societies and finds large diﬀerences in how they play an ultimatum
game. We also hope to shed light on the origins of human economic behavior and the role
of environmental experience, but exploit a very diﬀerent source of variation then Henrich
and colleagues. Our experiments can be seen as exploring which aspects of our behavior
are not confined to the heavily-socialized human species, but extend to primates that lack
any previous market experience. Specifically, if loss-aversion emerged in our evolutionary
past we would expect that closely related species would exhibit analogous behavior — and
may better understand the origins of our biases by understanding their expression in our
close evolutionary neighbors.

2.1

Economic Experiments with Children and Animals

Harbaugh, Krause and Berry also conduct experiments with similar goals to our own, exploiting age instead of cultural or species variation. Harbaugh et al. (2001a) conduct
numerous simple budgeting experiments on children between the ages of seven and eleven,
and find that violations of GARP are relatively rare. Harbaugh et al. (2001b) in contrast,
finds evidence of the endowment eﬀect in children as young as five, and finds no evidence
that the eﬀect diminishes with age up through college.9 This suggests that the endowment
eﬀect is not reduced by market exposure, though leaves open the possibility that children
learn this behavior sometime before age five.
While the use of animal subjects is widespread in psychology, their use as subjects in economics is relatively scarce. A notable exception is the work of Kagel, Battalio, Green, and
colleagues (Battalio et al., 1981; Battalio et al., 1985; Kagel et al., 1975; Kagel et al., 1981;
Kagel et al., 1990; Kagel et al., 1995). These researchers systematically explored a variety
of economic decisions (e.g., consumer demand, labor supply, risk aversion, and intertemporal choice) in two classic exemplars of associative learning: rats and pigeons. Having been
trained that diﬀerent levers each delivered a unique reward at an experimentally-variable
rate, subjects signaled preferences via their lever choices. Kagel and colleagues then employed a simple revealed preference method in which they examined their subjects’ choices
when presented with a “budget” of limited lever presses.
since both learned and innate behaviors have neural correlates that may be common across human subjects.
9
Closely related to loss-aversion, the endowment eﬀect is the observation that consumers often seem to
value goods more after possessing them than they do when they do not have them. This is often characterized
by a set of people randomly endowed with an object exhibiting a higher willingness to accept (price for selling
the good) that the control group’s willingness to pay. For a good overview of this bias and its connection to
loss aversion, see Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1991).
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Most applicable to our work, Kagel et al. (1975), explores how rats and pigeons respond
to a compensated price shift. They find that subjects’ choices during such a shift largely
respected GARP; in fact, utility maximization does a much better job of explaining their
data than any other available choice theory (including the canonical non-human psychological choice model, the matching law).10 In later experiments involving gambles, Kagel and
colleagues observed that on balance rats and pigeons obeyed expected-utility theory, but
do display some systematic biases. However, unlike results on human (and our capuchin)
subjects, Kagel and colleagues find that prospect theory does not explain the deviations
from expected-utility theory that are present in rats and pigeons.11
We depart from the important work of Kagel and coauthors in two key ways. First,
since rats and pigeons are very distantly related to humans, experiments on them are of
limited use in answering questions about high-level human decision making, since most of
the relevant neural architecture emerged after our common evolution. The contribution
of Kagel and coauthors is more closely akin to that of Becker (1962), demonstrating the
robustness of price-theory to large variation in the sophistication of agents.
Second, since rats and pigeons lack the cognitive sophistication of humans, researchers
working with these species can only carry out relatively simple choice experiments (i.e.,
choice between trained levers). These tasks seem unlikely to lead to the classic biases observed in humans, such as framing or reference-point eﬀects. Capuchin monkeys on the
other hand, are socially sophisticated organisms whose native ecology requires successful
management of scarce resources and risky tradeoﬀs. This sophistication and their evolutionary proximity to humans make capuchins far better-suited subjects with which to study
the mechanisms that enable economic decision-making; yet since our subjects have all been
raised in captivity we can limit the possibility that behavior analogous to human behavior
evolved socially, in response to similar environments.

3

Subjects: The Tufted Capuchin

The tufted (or brown) capuchin is a New-World monkey native to tropical climates within
Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. A cohabiting capuchin breeding-group
is usually characterized by a male-dominance hierarchy. A single alpha-male and several
sub-alpha males and females normally live together, with the alpha-male holding sexual
monopoly over the females within the group. Capuchins are often referred to as "extractive
foragers"; they prefer easy to eat fruit but when pressed are capable of pounding apart
10

For a good summary of the psychological literature on the matching law and its relationship to more
modern theories of choice see Herrnstein and Prelec (1991).
11
Instead, they find evidence of non-standard probability weighting that is best represented by some mix
of fanning out and fanning in (see Kagel, MacDonald & Battalio 1990).
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hard nuts, striping tree bark, raiding bee hives and even killing small vertebrates. For
an excellent survey of the species covering all aspects of their native ecology see Fragaszy,
Visalberghi & Fedigan (2004).
Besides this ability to explore the origins (and potentially the neural basis) of our preferences and biases, running economic experiments with capuchins carries with it several
tradeoﬀs compared to conventional human subjects. Experiments with human subjects
must inevitably assume some independence between the eﬀect being studied in the laboratory and such things as subjects’ selection into the subject pool, as well as pre- and
post-experimental conditions outside the laboratory. With non-human subjects, we can
control selection and directly manipulate various features of their daily environment and
social interactions. However, because of the diﬃculties involved in housing and maintaining
a rewarding environment for capuchin subjects, it is prohibitively costly to achieve sample
sizes to which economists are accustomed in testing humans. As such, we have chosen a
sample size typical for comparative cognition studies with primates (e.g., Brosnan and de
Waal, 2003; Brosnan and de Waal, 2004).

3.1

The Experimental Subjects

Our test subjects were all born in captivity and live in a single social group. Five adult
capuchins, two male [FL, NN] and three female [MD, HG, JM] ranging from seven to eight
years old, participated in this experiment. All were genetically unrelated with the exception
of JM [mother of MD]. Individuals were isolated from the rest of the group during each trial
in order to minimize the eﬀects of social interaction on experimental performance.
All subjects had previously participated in experiments concerning visual cognition,
social cognition, and tool use. For the purposes of this experiment, the most relevant were
those studies requiring the ability to trade a token for a food reward, most notably the
recent study by Brosnan & de Waal (2003).12 The scope for contamination was minimal
though, as our experiments required the capuchins to learn a considerably more diﬃcult
skill than in B&dW. In our studies, capuchins must decide how to intensively allocate a
budget of twelve tokens between a pair of options. In contrast the studies of B&dW only
provided subjects with one token and allowed only one trading option; subjects decided only
whether to trade or not (extensively). Additionally, ours were the first experiments in which
these subjects encountered choices that were risky or involved the oﬀering of one reward,
but the possibility of receiving another. In other words, all of the variation in choices from
12
Brosnan & de Waal (2003) use a token trading methodology to study capuchin other-regarding preferences when capuchins observe the results of other conspecifics’ trades. They find the fascinating result that
capuchins seem less willing to accept a food reward in trade for an otherwise worthless token, if they had
recently observed another capuchin receive a better food reward in trade.
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which we identify behavioral biases was novel to our subjects.

4

Methods: Setting and Apparatus

In all the following experiments subjects were allowed to trade tokens with one of two
experimenters. Each experiment is composed of several sessions, each session constitutes
twelve trials, and each trial is an opportunity to trade a token for one of two possible food
rewards. Every capuchin was endowed with a budget of tokens at the beginning of each
session and was allowed to allocate this budget however they saw fit; however trades had
to be conducted one at a time. Identical inch-wide aluminum discs were used as tokens in
all exchanges.
Trading was conducted in a cubical testing chamber (28 inches wide) that was adjacent
to the main cage, and into which subjects entered voluntarily. Two panels on opposite sides
of the chamber allowed participants to interact with experimenters through rectangular
openings, large enough for the capuchins to reach out of [and experimenters to reach into]
the testing chamber (see figure one). In each trial, two potential trades were oﬀered on
opposite sides of the cube, and the subject made its choice between these two options
by choosing which experimenter to exchange a token with. All sessions were videotaped
in addition to an RA recording each actor’s string of choices. The experimental trading
protocol is pictured below.

Figure 1: A capuchin decides which experimenter to trade with. The subject enters the
testing chamber (A), takes a token from a tray (B), places it in the hand of an experimenter
9

(C), and receives a food reward from a tray in his other hand (D). The film clip from which
these are drawn is available on the corresponding author’s website.

4.1

General Methods

Before each session of twelve trials, two experimenters (E1 and E2 , wearing diﬀerent colors)13 arranged an endowment of tokens on a tray, which was in view but out of reach of
the subject. To begin each session an experimenter pushed the tray within reach of the
subjects through the front of the testing chamber. Then to begin each trial the two experimenters simultaneously positioned themselves in front of opposite side panels (panel A in
figure 1). Each experimenter held a dish with a food reward (in clear view of the subjects)
approximately six inches above the opening closest to the interior of the cage, and extended
an empty hand into the other panel opening. If the capuchin took a token from the tray
(panel B) and placed it in an experimenter’s hand (panel C), then the experimenter would
lower his food dish and present the capuchin with the food reward (panel D).
In later conditions the experimenters presented capuchins with risky choices; before
lowering the food dish the experimenter would sometimes alter the amount of food, either
taking away or adding to the amount of food in the dish. Between each trial the experimenters swapped positions (replenishing the food in their dish if necessary), and resumed
their initial stance, with the food reward held several inches above the opening closest to
the main cage and an empty hand extended into the cube through the opening nearest
the tokens. The session ended after the subject has exchanged all twelve of their budgeted
tokens for food rewards. Non-standard trades (including those in which tokens were thrown
from the enclosure or those in which multiple tokens were pressed into an experimenter’s
hand), were not rewarded and the subject was allowed to make that choice again. So as
to minimize subject confusion, each experimenter represented a consistent choice for the
capuchin throughout each experiment. No capuchin was allowed to participate in more
than two experimental sessions on the same day, but could participate every day if they
wished too.
Each subject participated in experiments one, two, and three in sequence, moving from
one experiment to the next when their choices in the previous had stabilized. In each of our
experiments this criterion was set as five consecutive sessions in which a capuchin allocated
their tokens in near-constant proportion.14 We took these final choices to express each
actor’s preferred split between the choices each experiment aﬀords. In our data analysis
13
For expositional simplicity each experimenter is denoted by Ex where x is how many pieces of food the
experimenter would initially display before possibly adding or taking away pieces.
14
This meant their token allocations moved no more than one out of each session’s twelve trials, for five
consecutive sessions.
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we use only the last five sessions for each actor; each capuchin took between six to twelve
sessions to stabilize. Once a subject was finished with an experiment, we transitioned them
to the next by running several days worth of "forced trials." These trials were identical to
the subject’s next experiment, except that only one of his future choices (randomly selected
each trial) was available at any given time. In this way the capuchin both became aware
that the trading environment had changed, and was "forced" to became equally familiar
with both of his new options.

5

Preliminary Experiments: Capuchins Obey Price Theory

Our preliminary experiments closely mirror those of Kagel and coauthors, and allow us to
directly test that capuchin choice looks broadly rational and admits standard price theory.
In order to do so we first found a set of two goods for each subject between which they
were roughly indiﬀerent, then elicited their choice over a simple budget set between these
two goods. We then subjected each capuchin to a compensated price shift and examined
how they respond.

5.1

Methods: Identifying Preferences

Before beginning the pricing experiment, each participant was tested to identify two food
rewards between which the subject was roughly indiﬀerent. That is, starting with apples
as the first good, we looked for another good such that when allocating a budget of twelve
disks, the capuchin would reliably consume at least some of each good. Each experimenter
was assigned a diﬀerent good to display and exchange for a single token. When a subject
reliably consumed a positive quantity of both apples and the other food over at least ten
sessions, it was determined that the subject was roughly indiﬀerent between the two goods
oﬀered (these foods ended up being either grapes or jello cubes). Until this combination
was found, the non-apple experimenter changed the good they oﬀered until this interior
budgeting condition was satisfied.
5.1.1

Baseline and Compensated Price Shift

Once an appropriate good was found, the next steps of our price shift experiment are
very straightforward. To establish a baseline measurement, each one of three subjects were
repeatedly asked to allocate a budget of twelve disks between food one (apples) and food two
(either grapes or jello). This was done exactly as described in the general methods above,
with each experimenter trading one token for one piece of their respective food reward.
Each capuchin was run on this baseline condition until their choices stabilized; that is

11

until their choices didn’t change by more that one token for a span of five sessions. Once an
actor had stabilized, their behavior over the next week was averaged into a representative
consumption bundle (see the solid budget line in graph one). Using this bundle, a new
budget of disks was assigned to each actor for use in a compensated price shift.
This compensated price shift took the form of the experimenter who trades for apple
changing the amount they were willing to trade for a token. Instead of trading a token
for one piece of apple, the experimenter would now always display and trade two pieces of
apple for each token. This represented a fall in the price of apples by a half, and in order
to compensate for this each subject’s budget was reduced. This reduction was from twelve
to either nine or ten tokens, depending on which most closely shifted back the new budget
set such that the bundle the subject originally consumed was close to still lying on the new
budget line (see the dotted budget lines in graph one). Each subject’s preferences were
again allowed to stabilize, then another week’s worth of sessions were elicited under this
new price régime.

12

6

Results: Preliminary Price Theory Experiments

The results of the preliminary pricing experiment are summarized in table and graph one.
In graph one, the solid line represents the initial budget set each actor was presented in the
baseline condition, while the dotted line represents each actor’s compensated budget after
the price of apples falls in half. In order to satisfy GARP, an actor must consume (weakly)
more apples after the shift then before. All subjects choices are aggregated over at least
ten sessions, and every actor’s choices easily satisfies GARP at the 1% level.
Graph One: Budget Sets and Subject Choices

Baseline and Compensated Price Shift:
Capuchins Obey GARP
12
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Each point represents the purchasing behavior of a subject after their choices had stabilized,
averaged over a week.
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Table One: Price Theory and Compensated Price Shifts
Baseline Experiment: Subjects given a budget of 12 disks, both goods have price 1.
Actor 1 (FL) Actor 2 (NN) Actor 3 (AG)
Food used for good one:
Food used for good two:
Percent of budget spent on good one:
Number of trials:
Compensated Price Shift:
Good one’s price falls from 1 to

1
2,

Apples
Jello
47%
132

Apples
Grapes
42%
144

Apples
Jello
51%
144

good two’s price stays 1, and the budget shrinks.

New budget of disks:
Percent of budget spent on good one:
Good one consumed before → after shift:
Number of trials:

10
69%
5.6 → 13.8
140

10
64%
5.0 → 12.8
100

9
50%
6.1 → 9.0
117

0.001
0.001

0.004
0.001

0.965
0.001

Choice % responds to price shift:15
Change in choice satisfies GARP:16

Tests of significance reported as p-values of a two-sided test.
Note though that with only one compensated price shift, satisfying GARP is a weak test.
Indeed as Becker (1962) points out, many forms of random behavior can satisfy GARP in
response to compensated price changes. Accordingly we apply a more rigorous test as to
whether each actor’s behavior could arise solely from random behavior. In table one we
examine the percent of their budget each capuchin spends on good one both before and
after the price shift, and test whether this responds significantly to the change. Two out
of three subjects showed a significant response to the compensated price change at the 1%
level in this more stringent test.

7

Main Experiments: Are Capuchins Reference-Dependant?

Once our original three subjects completed these initial experiments, an additional two
subjects were recruited for our main set of experiments. In this set of experiments the
same budgeting procedure was used to elicit choices, with each session composed of twelve
opportunities to trade a token for one of two possible food rewards. Unlike the initial
experiment though, only apples were used as food reward, and the experimenters no longer
15
This is a two-sided p-test that the fraction of trials the subject chooses apples responds to the price
shift; NN and FL change significantly while AG does not.
16
Our test of GARP is a two-sided p-test that the number of pieces of apple that the actor consumes
weakly increases after the compensated price-shift.
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automatically presented the capuchin with the apples displayed in their tray when given
a token. Now, experimenters sometime altered the food in the presentation tray before
making that tray available to the subject. In this way, we were able to independently vary
what the capuchin was initially shown and what the capuchin would receive in exchange
for a token, with the latter sometimes consisting of a gamble.

7.1

Methods: Experiment One, Stochastic Dominance

In experiment one, a capuchin could trade their tokens with one of two experimenters.
Experimenter E2 represented a random payoﬀ of one or two apple pieces each with equal
probability, and experimenter E1 represented a sure payoﬀ of one piece. E1 and E2 also
diﬀered in how many pieces they initially showed the capuchin; E2 displayed two squares of
apple, while E1 displayed only one square of apple. This experiment tests whether capuchin
choice respects first-order stochastic dominance; that is if they prefer gambles that weakly
dominate another option.
Specifically, after being given a token experimenter E1 always lowered his dish to present
the subject with one apple piece — exactly as many as he had displayed. In contrast E2
started every trial displaying two apple pieces in her tray, but would only deliver both pieces
half the time she was traded with. The other half of the time E2 would remove one of her
two apple pieces and deliver only the remaining piece to the subject. A random-number
generator determined beforehand whether any given trade would result in a payoﬀ of two
or one; when a apple piece was removed it was placed into an opaque receptacle underneath
the testing table that was both out-of-sight and out-of-reach of the subjects.

7.2

Methods: Experiment Two, Reference-Dependence

In experiment two, subjects chose between experimenters who both delivered identical gambles — diﬀering only in whether they added to or subtracted from their initial displayed
oﬀering of one or two apple pieces. This was designed to test whether capuchins would
respond to a simple framing manipulation, presenting some payoﬀs as gains and some as
losses, while holding constant the underlying payoﬀs.
Specifically, E1 and E2 would stand on opposite sides of the testing chamber displaying
one and two apple pieces, respectively. Upon being presented with a token, E2 would present
the subject with either the two apple pieces he had displayed, or would visibly remove one
piece and deliver only the remaining apple piece to the subject. When an apple piece was
removed, it was placed into an opaque receptacle underneath the testing table that was
out-of-sight and out-of-reach of the subject.
When the subject traded with E1 however, she would either present the single piece she
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displayed, or add one apple piece and deliver two pieces. When this bonus piece was added
it was drawn from an identical receptacle.
Essentially then, both experimenters represented a fifty-fifty lottery of one or two apple pieces. They diﬀered only in whether they initially had displayed one or two apples,
framing for the marginal apple piece as either a gain or a loss. A random-number generator
determined beforehand whether any given trade would result in a payoﬀ of two or one; we
call these the bonus vs. penalties conditions.

7.3

Methods: Experiment Three, Loss-Aversion

In experiment three, subjects chose between experimenters who both delivered a payoﬀ of
one apple piece — diﬀering only in whether they initially displayed one or two pieces. This
experiment was designed to test for the presence of reference-eﬀects in riskless situations,
and when combined with experiment two, allows us to measure loss-aversion.
Specifically, E1 and E2 would stand on opposite sides of the testing chamber, displaying
one and two apple pieces, respectively. Upon being presented a token, E2 always removed
one apple piece and delivered the remaining piece to the subject. The removed square was
placed into the opaque receptacle underneath the testing table. In contrast if the subject
traded with E1 , she always presented the single square she displayed.
Essentially then trading with either E1 or E2 delivered identically payoﬀs. However, on
all trades E1 gave exactly the quantity of apple he displayed, while E2 displayed a quantity
of apple that was always reduced from two to one before it was made available to the
subject.

8

Non-Parametric Results: Main Experiments

The results of all our experiments are reported below in tables two through four, broken
down by subject. We will first discuss what can be learned from our results without imposing
any significant parametric assumptions; in the next section we fit a simplified version of
the standard prospect-theoretic utility function to our subjects which allows more precise
analysis.
The results of experiment one are summarized below. Table two shows how each subject
behaved over five sessions (60 trials), after an initial set of sessions in which their choices
stabilized as they learned about the experimental choices.
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Table Two: Experiment One, Gambles and Stochastic Dominance
E1 shows 1 and gives 1, E2 shows 2, then gives 1 or 2 with prob. 1/2.
Subject (name):
Percent of trials E1 chosen:†
Sessions till stable:

1 (FL)
10%

2 (HG)
18%

3 (JM)
12%

4 (MD)
22%

5 (NN)
5%

7

6

7

6

11

† All subject’s choices diﬀerent from 50% at the 1% level in a two-sided p-test.
The capuchins express a clear preference (87% of trades) for E2 , the experimenter who
displays two apple pieces and delivers either one or two pieces with equal probability. This
is of course not surprising; the second option stochastically dominates the first and gives on
average a half-piece more of apple.
Given this result though, the results of experiment two are quite surprising. All subjects
left experiment one conditioned to favor E2 , the experimenter who displays two pieces of
food. Despite this, in experiment two the capuchins quickly reverse this preference and
trade much more with the experimenter who displays only one piece of food. Table three
summarizes these results.
Table Three: Experiment Two, Reference-Dependence in Gambles
E1 shows 1 and E2 shows 2, then both give 1 or 2 with prob. 1/2.
Subject (name):
Percent of trials E1 chosen:†
Sessions till stable:

1 (FL)
68%

2 (HG)
70%

3 (JM)
70%

4 (MD)
70%

5 (NN)
78%

11

9

9

9
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† All subject’s choices diﬀerent from 50% at the 1% level in a two-sided p-test.
Contrary to both their conditioning and the intuition that naive subjects would favor greater
initial displays of food (experimenter E2 ), capuchins express a preference for E1 , the experimenter who frames the gamble as a 50% chance of a bonus rather that a 50% chance of a loss.
Pooled, subjects traded with E1 in 71% of trials in their last five sessions (again, measured
after each subject’s choices stabilized). For all five subjects this change was significantly
diﬀerent not just from experiment one but from random (50-50) behavior.
Note that any theory of choice which does not take into account reference-dependence
fails to predict this pattern of behavior. Indeed, since our experimenters switch sides of the
testing chamber between each trial, in order to express a preference between E1 and E2 a
capuchin has to actively follow their preferred experimenter from side to side, expending
both time and attention.
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Experiment three shows this eﬀect is not confined to risky choices, and when combined
with experiment two suggest that capuchins are not just reference-dependant, but lossaverse. The results are summarized in table four below.
Table Four: Experiment Three, Riskless Reference-Dependence
E1 shows 1 and E2 shows 2, then both give 1.
Subject (name):
Percent of trials E1 chosen:†

1 (FL)
73%

Choice % greater than in exp. 2, p-value:
Pooled, choice % greater than in exp. 2:

0.27

Sessions till stable:

9

2 (HG)
75%

3 (JM)
80%

4 (MD)
82%

0.27
0.10
0.07
p < 0.023, two-sided p-test.
10

10

8

5 (NN)
87%
0.11
10

† All subject’s choices diﬀerent from 50% at the 1% level in a two-sided p-test.
Subjects strongly preferred experimenter E1 over experimenter E2 (who initially displayed
one and two pieces of apple, respectively), despite the fact that both always provide the
same, sure payoﬀ of one apple piece. For all subjects this preference (% of trials trading
with E1 ) was stronger than in experiment two, suggesting this was not due to conditioning
from the previous experiment. Since the only diﬀerence between the two experimenters
was that E2 showed more than he eventually gave, these results suggest our capuchins are
reference-dependant even in riskless choice settings.
Also, note that in experiment two subjects chose between E2 who gave a half-chance of
a loss and E1 who gave a half-chance of a gain, both of these forces pushing the subject to
chose E1 . In experiment three however, E1 always gives exactly what they showed while E2
delivers a sure loss. An interpretation of the fact that subjects show a stronger preference
in experiment three than two (79% to 71%), is that a sure loss has a stronger eﬀect than the
combined eﬀects of a half-loss and a half-gain, or that losses aﬀect subject’s choices more
than gains. In other words:
|loss| >

1
2

|loss| + 12 |gain| ⇔ |loss| > |gain|

Thus, the pooled p-test of experiment three being stronger than experiment two (p < 0.023
in a two-sided p-test) can be taken to confirm the presence of loss-aversion in capuchin
choice.
We now turn to a simple utility function and choice model which will allow us to test
this more formally and to provide a point estimate of the ratio of the eﬀects of losses to
that of gains, a number often called the coeﬃcient of loss-aversion. We then compare our
results to estimates derived from human behavior.
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9

Parametric Results: A Simple Choice Model

In order to more formally organize these results we now introduce a simple choice model
which nests both loss-aversion and reference-dependence in a more general model of utility.
This allows us to estimate parameters such as the capuchins’ degree of loss-aversion, and
compare these parameters to analogous human estimates from both lab and field data. Our
model is a linear simplification of the utility function found in Koszegi & Rabin (2004)
in which the reference point when considering a gamble is what the experimenter initially
displays to the subject.
Notation 1 We’ll write a gamble as a three-tuple (r, a, b), where the experimenter displays
r then gives the subject payoﬀs a or b with equal probability. Note that if a = b the experimenter always gives the subject the same payoﬀ and the oﬀered trade involves a sure
bet.
So for example, if the experimenter displayed one piece of apple and gives the capuchin
either one or two pieces (each with equal probability), we would write that experimenter’s
oﬀered trade as X = (1, 1, 2). Note that since all probabilities are 50-50, the expected value
(EV) of any gamble (r, a, b) is just 12 (a + b).
Formally, we assume that a subject S’s utility for a simple gamble G = (r, a, b), is given
by:
US (G) = α · (losses from ref. point) + β · (gains from ref. point) + γ · (exp. value) + εS ,
or
US (G) = α · (r − a) + β · (b − r) + γ · EV (G) + εS
That is, we assume that a capuchin’s utility is a simple linear function over losses
and gains (with respect to what was originally displayed) and the expected value of the
gamble. This utility representation imbeds both expected-value maximization and complete
reference-dependence, allowing us to estimate both the degree loss-aversion, and its relative
strength. This is, we can test not only the relative strength of losses and gains, but also
how important these reference-eﬀects are with respect to changes in expected food rewards.
Completing the identifying model, we assume that agents choose the gamble with the highest
expected utility given a random shock ε for each gamble where ε is drawn each trial (we
allow for ε to be correlated within subject.)
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Table five below summarizes how each gamble falls with respect to expected gains, losses,
and food rewards.
Table Five: Expected Gains, Losses, and Values for each Experimental Choice
Experiment:
Experimenter:
Gamble oﬀered:
Gains:
Losses:
Expected Value:
% of trials chosen:

One

Two

Three

E1

E2

E1

E2

E1

E2

(1, 1, 1)
0
0
1
13%

(2, 1, 2)
0

(1, 1, 2)

(2, 1, 2)
0

1
2
1 12

0
1 12
71%

(1, 1, 1)
0
0
1
79%

(2, 1, 1)
0
1
1
21%

87%

1
2

1
2
1 12

29%

Table constructed pooling all subjects’ last five sessions after choices stabilize (60 trials).
Using these values we can fit our simple choice model to the data using standard regression
techniques. The objects of interest are the weights subjects place on losses, gains, and
expected food rewards: our utility parameters α, β, and γ. We are also interested in the
ratio of the slope of the utility function over losses and gains, −α
β . This measure of the
"kink" in a subject’s utility function is commonly used to quantify loss-aversion in human
behavior, and is commonly called the coeﬃcient of loss-aversion.

9.1

Regression Analysis: Parameter Values

In order to provide point estimates for our parameters α, β, and γ, we fit our choice model
to the observed behavior of our capuchins over all three experiments, pooling across all
five subjects but allowing ε to be correlated within subject. We also use only the last five
sessions for each subject in each experiment so as to study only the latter, stable choices of
our subjects.
To fit our model we assume that agents maximize utility subject to the random ε
utility shocks each option draws on each trial. This can be accomplished with standard
regression techniques under two distributional assumptions on the ε term. If ε is normally
distributed this reduces to a simple Probit regression; if ε is distributed type-one extreme
value this reduces to a Logit regression. Specifically, if the subject is choosing between
gambles G1 = (r1 , a1 , b1 ) and G2 = (r2 , a2 , b2 ), then we estimate the following equation:
Pr (G1 | {G1 , G2 }) = Φ(α · ∆LOSSES + β · ∆GAIN S + γ · ∆EV ), or
Pr (G1 | {G1 , G2 }) = Φ(α·[(r1 −a1 )−(r2 −a2 )]+β·[(b1 −r1 )−(b2 −r2 )]+γ·[EV (G1 )−EV (G2 )])
where Φ is the CDF of the appropriate distribution. Note that we specify this equation
without a constant term; this restriction has the natural interpretation that if two gambles
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are identical in every way, the capuchin chooses each option with equal probability. The
results of both regressions are reported in table six below.
Table Six: Estimating the Choice Model
Probit
Coef. Std.Err.
∆LOSSES (α):
∆GAIN S (β):
∆EV (γ):
# of observations:

−0.818
0.308
3.040

0.084
0.058
0.313

Logit
Coef. Std.Err.
−1.345
0.478
5.089

900

0.146
0.096
0.146
900

Regressions clustered by subject, all coeﬃcients significant at the 1% level.
In both specifications the coeﬃcients on losses and gains are of similar magnitudes, are of
the sign predicted by reference-dependence, and are significant at the 1% level. In both
regressions the coeﬃcient on EV is also roughly five times the magnitude of those on gains
and losses. This is perhaps not that surprising, given that our treatment only looks at
the long-run behavior of our subjects after facing the same choice many times and our
reference-point treatment is a relatively mild framing intervention.
In much of the work on human loss-aversion, the ratio of the coeﬃcients on losses and
gains is commonly used as a measure of loss-aversion, representing how "kinked" the utility
function is at the reference point. That is, the ratio −α
β (commonly called the coeﬃcient of
loss-aversion) measures how much more sensitive subjects are to losses than gains.
We estimate this ratio under both specifications; table seven reports both sets of results.
Table Seven: Estimating the Coeﬃcient of Loss-Aversion

coeﬃcient of loss-aversion, −α/β:
test if −α/β = 1:
test if −α/β = 2.5:
# of observations:

Probit
Coef. Std.Err.

Logit
Coef. Std.Err.

2.654
0.551
p < 0.003
p < 0.780

2.813
0.642
p < 0.005
p < 0.625

900

900

All test statistics computed using the delta method and clustering by subject.
Across both specifications the ratio of losses to gains is roughly 2.7 to 1, meaning our
capuchin subjects seem weigh losses more than twice as heavily as gains. While these
estimates are parametric and should be interpreted with caution, in magnitude our estimates are strikingly similar to measures of human loss-aversion in both lab and field data.
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Tversky & Kahneman (1991) summarize a large body of survey evidence on minimally
acceptable gambles and find a ratio of roughly 2.5 to 1. Average ratios of willingness to
pay to willingness to accept found in most endowment-eﬀect experiments (see for example
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1990) yield a ratio of around 2.7 to 1. Bernartzi and Thaler
(1995) calibrates a ratio of approximately 2.3 from the aggregate risk preferences of stock
investors.

10

Conclusion

Our results indicate that loss-averse behavior is not confined to humans but is present in
our closest evolutionary neighbors and is most likely the result of an evolutionarily-ancient
and common behavioral mechanism. As field evidence increasingly suggests that referencedependant and loss-averse behavior is widely present in the economy, the origins of these
biases may influence how we incorporate them into an adequate model of individual decision
making. If these bises are an innate feature of how our brains represent choices, we may be
more inclined to believe they will be broadly present in both common and novel settings,
stable across time and cultures, and resistant to elimination by either market exposure or
education.
Our paper also suggests the utility of methodological exchanges between economics
and the closely related behavioral sciences. Bringing the analytic framework of revealed
preference to bear on questions at the intersection of economics, biology and psychology
carries the possibility of insights useful to each.
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